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Abstract   
This paper documents and studies sources of international differences in participation and holdings in stocks, 
private businesses, and homes among households aged 50+ in the US, England, and eleven continental 
European countries, using new internationally comparable, household-level data. With greater integration of asset 
and labor markets and policies, households of given characteristics should be holding more similar portfolios for 
old age. We decompose observed differences across the Atlantic, within the US, and within Europe into those 
arising from differences: a) in the distribution of characteristics and b) in the influence of given characteristics. We 
find that US households are generally more likely to own these assets than their European counterparts. 
However, European asset owners tend to hold smaller real, PPP-adjusted amounts in stocks and larger in private 
businesses and primary residence than US owners at comparable points in the distribution of holdings, even 
controlling for differences in configuration of characteristics. Differences in characteristics often play minimal or no 
role. Differences in market conditions are much more pronounced among European countries than among US 
regions, suggesting significant potential for further integration. 
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  1.  Introduction 
Economic integration represents the removal of market segmentation imposed by 
geographical barriers. In its broad sense, it applies to all markets: for goods and services, 
assets (financial and real), debts, and labor. As an ideal often echoed in public discussions 
on the European Union and on US federalism, it amounts to the process of harmonizing 
market conditions faced by households, regardless of location within the Union.  
Intertemporal models of consumption, saving, and portfolio choice provide a 
theoretical context within which to understand the implications of economic integration at 
the household level. An economic agent of given preferences and characteristics makes 
optimizing choices for consumption and asset holdings in the face of processes for labor 
income and asset returns, policies (e.g. for taxation or retirement financing), and 
constraints (e.g. credit market imperfections, informational limitations). Equilibrium 
levels of consumption and asset holdings result from the interaction of household 
preferences and characteristics with the processes, policies, and constraints facing the 
household.
  Although market conditions in certain countries may not initially be as 
conducive to participation and/or to large holdings as those in other countries in the 
group, integration makes these ‘market conditions’ progressively more similar.
1  
Even under full integration, though, observed asset/debt holdings and consumption 
levels need not be the same in different countries or regions. These depend not only on 
market conditions facing households of given characteristics but also on the configuration 
of such characteristics in the population. Once differences in characteristics are controlled 
for, greater integration should be reflected in greater similarity of market behavior among 
households of given characteristics located in different geographical areas.    2
Starting from this premise, the paper introduces three novelties. First, it offers a novel 
perspective to integration that complements existing approaches by focusing on the 
relationship between household characteristics and asset market behavior of a particularly 
interesting and policy-relevant group of households. These are households aged 50+, who 
are well into their accumulation stage and face the consequences of the demographic 
transition and of the policy responses to it.
2 Results are reported for a range of assets, 
from stockholding (direct plus indirect in the form of mutual funds and retirement 
accounts
3), to private businesses, to homes.  
Second, it is the first paper that uncovers patterns of differences in asset market 
behavior using a set of newly available, internationally comparable, household-level data 
for the US and for 12 European countries. For the United States, we use data from the 
Health and Retirement Study (HRS); for England, data from the English Longitudinal 
Study of Aging (ELSA); and for eleven additional European countries, we use data from 
the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE). 
In view of the emergence of micro data sets that allow comparisons among a large 
number of countries, innovative ways of making large-scale comparisons are needed. The 
third, methodological, novelty of this paper is linked to its new perspective on integration 
and amounts to a cross-fertilization between labor studies of discrimination and 
household finance. International comparisons of asset market behavior need to compare 
households of similar characteristics; discrimination cannot be established in the labor 
literature unless remaining characteristics are controlled for. We employ modern 
counterfactual techniques originally developed in the labor literature to study 
discrimination or other systematic differences in wages for similar remaining   3
characteristics.
4 We first use the US as a benchmark against which to compare European 
countries; then, compare different regions in the US; and finally, countries within Europe.  
The broad existing literature on economic integration has followed three main 
approaches, each focused on a different feature of a fully integrated group of countries. 
One approach is based on the idea that integration should be reflected in considerable 
international  flows across markets. Depending on which market is chosen for study, 
emphasis is placed on cross-border flows of goods and services,
5 claims to financial
6 or 
real assets,
7 or labor with its implications for immigration policy.  
A second approach focuses on prices instead of quantities. In a fully integrated 
market for goods, the law of one price should hold.
8 In a fully integrated asset market, the 
price of risk should be the same, i.e. expected returns should be the same across assets 
that have the same covariance with world risk.
9 As market segmentation diminishes, 
expected returns in a country should be more a function of covariance with world risk and 
less a function of the variance of that country’s returns.  
A third approach has focused on consumption behavior under international risk 
sharing. In a fully integrated world, households would insure against output risks 
idiosyncratic to their countries by holding securities in other countries subject to different 
shocks. Under perfect risk sharing, country-specific shocks to consumption growth would 
bear no correlation to country-specific output growth shocks; and consumption growth 
rates would have high correlations internationally even if output growth rates did not. 
Lewis (1999) termed the observed violation of these patterns ‘consumption home bias’, 
surveyed the literature, and linked it to home equity bias.    4
Our findings suggest that US households of given characteristics tend to have greater 
participation probabilities than their European counterparts, often across the range of 
assets considered. However, European asset owners tend to hold smaller real, PPP-
adjusted amounts in stocks and larger amounts in real assets (private businesses and 
primary residence) than US households at comparable positions of the distribution of 
holdings, even after controlling for differences in the configuration of characteristics in 
the asset holder pools. In most cases, international differences in the configuration of 
characteristics play minimal or no role in generating observed international differences in 
asset market behavior. Differences in market conditions are substantially more 
pronounced among European countries than among US regions, suggesting significant 
potential for further integration. 
In Section 2, we describe the data for households aged 50 or above as regards asset 
market participation rates and levels of holdings among holders. In Section 3, we focus 
on asset market participation. We distinguish between the role of the configuration of 
characteristics and of the contributions of given characteristics to participation in the US 
and Europe. In Section 4, we focus on asset owners and decompose observed 
international differences in asset holdings at various percentiles of the distribution of such 
holdings into two parts: (i) those that result from differences in configuration of 
household characteristics; and (ii) those that arise from a different relationship between 
characteristics and amounts. We link results to existing indicators of the state of relevant 
asset markets and of government policy throughout. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
   5
2.  The Data 
We use the three most comprehensive data sets on portfolios of households aged 50 
and above currently available. The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) surveys US older 
households every two years since 1992; the English Longitudinal Study of Aging (ELSA) 
surveys older households in England with waves in 2002 and in 2004; the Survey of 
Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe (SHARE), modeled after the HRS and ELSA, 
collected its first wave in 2004 in Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, France, 
Switzerland, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Greece; and in 2005 in Belgium. We use the 
2004/5 wave for all countries. 
Table 1 reports participation rates and levels, by quartile of holdings, for three main 
asset types (stockholding,
10 private business, and principal residence); as well as levels of 
net worth, all in PPP-adjusted thousands of 2004 dollars and for households aged 50 or 
above. Taking Europe as a whole, net worth is slightly higher than in the US at the 
median, but lower at the lower and upper quartiles. There is considerable variation of net 
worth within Europe, and country rankings change as we move along the distribution. 
The lowest median net worth is observed in Sweden and the largest in England. For the 
lowest quartile, Austria and Belgium provide the two extremes. Switzerland comes top 
for the richest quartile, with Sweden at the bottom.  
Ownership of stocks, either direct or indirect through mutual funds and retirement 
accounts, is greatest in Sweden, Denmark, and in the US. It is smallest in Austria, Italy, 
Spain, and Greece. Homeownership is highest in Spain, and lowest in Germany, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and Austria. The highest rates of business ownership are 
observed in Sweden and Switzerland, with the US and Denmark a short distance behind   6
them. The lowest rates are observed in Austria and England. Asset ownership rates differ 
also by region within the US, but the range of variation is substantially smaller. 
Turning to the size of asset holdings, we find a stark contrast between real and 
financial assets. The US dominates practically every European country in stockholding;
11 
and is dominated by the vast majority of European countries in real assets, both measured 
in real terms, PPP adjusted.
12 US regions also exhibit some heterogeneity in asset 
holdings. For stocks and private businesses, the range of values across US regions is 
substantially smaller than in Europe. This is also true for the lowest quartile of the 
housing distribution, but for the median and the 75
th quartile there is variation in the US 
comparable to that in Europe. 
 
3.  Sources of International Differences in Asset Participation 
3.1  Estimation Model and Methodology 
In this section, we decompose differences in observed participation rates into those 
resulting from different configuration of characteristics in the population and those 
resulting from international differences in the influence of a given set of characteristics. 
We will refer to the former as ‘covariate effects’ and to the latter as ‘coefficient effects’. 
This decomposition is based on a set of probit regressions, where participation in a given 
asset is regressed on a number of household characteristics.  
We use as regressors the following variables: 2
nd order age polynomial, gender, 
household size, education (high school certificate, and  post secondary degree), work 
status (retired/working/unemployed-other inactive),
13 marital status (couple/widow/never 
married), recall ability
14, self-reported bad health (includes responses ‘fair’ and ‘poor’ in   7
HRS), subjective probability to leave a bequest, whether household provides help to 
relatives/neighbors, whether it is involved in voluntary activities, income quartile, wealth 
quartile (where wealth excludes the asset in question).  
We first run one probit for each asset in the country used as the ‘base’. Table A.1 
presents a representative set of coefficient estimates. We then construct the 
counterfactual, 
base i p
, ˆ , namely the average predicted probability of participation that the 
population in country i would exhibit if they faced the coefficients on characteristics that 
were estimated for the base country. The difference in participation rates between the 
base and country i is then decomposed into two differences: 
{ } { }
i base i base i base i base pr p p pr pr pr − + − = −
, , ˆ ˆ        (1) 
The first (‘covariate effects’) is the difference between participation by residents in the 
base country and the average participation probability that residents of country i would 
exhibit if they faced the same coefficients as the base country. The second (‘coefficient 
effects’) is the difference between participation in country i and the participation 
probability that its residents would exhibit on average if they were faced with coefficients 
of the base country. This yields point estimates of the two effects. We compute bootstrap 
standard errors by drawing (with replacement) the full sample size from both countries 
and repeating this estimation and decomposition two hundred times. 
The more integrated a set of countries or regions, the closer the probabilities of 
participation should be for households of given characteristics. Coefficient effects would 
speak directly to this question. Covariate effects show the extent to which differences in 
participation probabilities are due to a relatively unfavorable composition of the 
population in a particular country or region. We first use the US as ‘base’ and compare to   8
it European countries. In order to set a realistic standard, we then consider coefficient and 
covariate effects among US regions (using the Midwest as the base region), which share a 
common federal government but also allow state discretion, especially on fiscal matters. 
Finally, we examine integration among European countries, using Germany as the base. 
Coefficient effects (‘market conditions’) in probit regressions are in principle a mix 
of demand- and supply-side factors. For example, better ‘market conditions’ for 
stockholding participation in the US could be resulting partly from institutional factors 
(e.g., transactions costs and the functioning of financial markets) and partly from taste 
and cultural factors favoring risky financial instruments. Moreover, the two may be 
linked: tastes and culture contribute to shaping institutions, while institutional factors can 
also influence the evolution of market culture. Integration is likely to work along both 
margins: harmonizing institutions and policies, and promoting convergence in tastes and 
culture. While precise attribution of coefficient effects to specific features of the market 
environment in each country is beyond the scope of our paper, we find that the pattern 
implied by our estimates is consistent with the pattern of various widely-used indicators 
of institutional and policy features. This in turn implies that observed coefficient effects 
are not the result of demand factors alone, and that harmonizing institutions and policies 
can be an important avenue towards achieving greater similarity in the link between 
household characteristics and asset market behavior.  
 
3.2  US-Europe Comparisons 
Figure 1 shows coefficient and covariate effects on average probabilities of 
participation in the stock market for European countries using the US as the base country.   9
Our findings imply that households of given characteristics are more likely to invest in 
stocks if they live in the US rather than in most European countries. According to our 
estimates, there are only three European countries whose older households would be 
discouraged from participating if they faced US market conditions: Sweden (where the 
effect exceeds 25 percentage points), Denmark and France.  
Table 2 presents a number of stock market indicators. According to these, the US 
has the lowest transactions costs in the stock market, the greatest spending on information 
and communication technology as a percentage of GDP, and the highest stockholder 
protection. All three factors have been shown in existing literature on stockholding 
participation to encourage participation. The special position of the aforementioned three 
European countries seems to be related in part to the state of pension systems.
15 In 
Sweden and Denmark, mandatory retirement accounts exist.
16 The extremely high 
internet penetration in Sweden must have further contributed to the results. Finally, these 
are 3 of the 5 European countries in our sample where defined-contribution, occupational 
pension plans were available (in 2004), most likely creating spillovers to forms of 
stockholding included in our data.
17  
Older households in Europe are also estimated to have observable characteristics 
that are less conducive to participation in the stock market than their US counterparts. 
This is true even in Sweden, where observed stockholding participation is larger than the 
US. Although in most cases coefficient effects dominate covariate effects in size, 
population characteristics are estimated to be more important than market conditions in 
Belgium, Spain England, and France. In the last case, effects are of opposite signs, and 
characteristics are responsible for observed more limited stockholding relative to the US.   10
Let us now turn to ownership of (at least a share in a) private business (Figure 2). 
Our estimates imply that market conditions are largely responsible for lower participation 
in private business in Europe than in the US. Only in Sweden are market conditions 
found to be more conducive to participation than in the US. Our estimates of covariate 
effects imply that most European older populations have characteristics equally 
conducive to business ownership as those of the US population.
18 
A number of indicators suggest that estimated coefficient effects reflect supply-side 
conditions rather than simply a stronger taste of US households for business ownership. 
Particularly telling is the World Bank ‘Ease of Doing Business’ indicator (Table 3). In 
terms of the overall index, the US is where it is easiest to do business among the 
countries we examine. The index takes a rather simple approach to aggregating rankings 
across different criteria, namely straight averaging. Sweden ranks above the US in 
various aspects, such as dealing with licenses, registering property, trading across 
borders, and enforcing contracts. It seems plausible that such issues have considerable 
weight in the decision of older Swedish households to participate in private business, 
contributing to the special role of Sweden in our findings. 
For homeownership, coefficient effects are positive in most cases, suggesting that 
households of given characteristics face favorable market conditions in the US (Figure 3). 
Exceptions are Spain and Greece. We discuss indicators of market conditions below, 
when we look at size of holdings. Covariate effects are positive in Germany, the 
Netherlands, Austria and Spain, and negative in Belgium and Switzerland, thus giving a 
mixed picture on whether the characteristics of US homeowners are more conducive to 
homeownership than those of European homeowners.   11
3.3  Integration within the US 
In this section, we carry out the analysis across four US regions, Midwest (MW, 
used as the base region), Northeast (NE), South (S), and West (W). We do so for two 
main reasons. First, coefficient effects across the Atlantic look sizeable, but it is useful to 
put them into perspective by comparing them to some realistic case of ‘full’ integration. 
Clearly, zero coefficient effects represent an extreme theoretical benchmark unlikely to 
be met in practice. Second, while the US enjoys mobility of labor and capital across 
geographical regions, a common monetary policy and stock market, and common federal 
institutions, it also exhibits variation across its States, e.g. with respect to fiscal matters. It 
is thus interesting to see if our method is sensitive enough to pick up significant 
differences in market conditions arising from such considerations, and how large these 
effects are compared to those across the Atlantic. 
The top panel of Table 4 shows regional differences in average participation 
probabilities for each asset within the US. The column ‘Total Difference’ lists observed 
differences in ownership rates relative to the reference region (MW). Households in the 
MW exhibit somewhat higher participation in all three assets examined, especially 
relative to the S for stockholding, and to the NE for ownership of home and business.  
The column ‘Difference due to Coefficients’ reports by how much participation 
probabilities would change on average if residents faced instead the market conditions of 
the reference region. Market conditions in the MW are typically estimated to be more 
conducive to participation in any of these asset classes. Though statistically significant, 
most estimated differences are small.
19    12
The configuration of (older) household characteristics in the MW is estimated to be 
only slightly more conducive to ownership of the three assets considered (see third 
column: ‘Difference due to Covariates’). Covariate effects are often statistically 
significant, positive, but all quite small. All in all, the pattern of coefficient (and 
covariate) effects suggests much greater integration within US regions than across the 
Atlantic, strengthening our confidence in the approach. 
 
3.4  Integration within Europe 
In this section, we consider how European countries differ in the distribution of 
characteristics and in the influence of given characteristics on asset market participation. 
The bottom panel of Table 4 reports differences in rates of asset market participation and 
their breakdown into coefficient and covariate effects for Europe using Germany as the 
base. We find that differences in participation rates across Europe arise mainly from 
differences in market conditions rather than in the mix of household characteristics. With 
very few exceptions, coefficient effects are statistically significant and often quite large, 
especially for stockholding and homeownership, though much smaller for business 
ownership. Covariate effects are insignificant more often than not, and usually small. 
Market conditions in Germany are estimated to be impressively less conducive to 
stockholding compared to a number of other countries. Indeed, if Swedes were to face 
German market conditions, their average participation rate in stockholding would drop by 
more than 45 percentage points. The Danes and the French would also exhibit substantial 
drops, between 21 and 28 percentage points. Still, German conditions are found to be 
more conducive to stockholding than those in Austria, Spain, Italy, and Greece. Covariate   13
effects are generally small for stockholding, except perhaps for Spanish and Italian 
households, which would exhibit 5 to 7 percentage points lower average participation 
probabilities compared to the German population, if all faced the same conditions. 
Germany has notoriously low homeownership rates. Our estimates show that this 
has nothing to do with the mix of observed characteristics of German households, which 
is either similar or more conducive to homeownership (sometimes substantially so – 
witness the Netherlands, Spain and England) than the other European countries 
considered. The real source of the difference is housing market conditions, and the 
economic significance of this difference is very large indeed. Homeownership rates in 
southern Europe and England would drop by between 28 and 43 percentage points if their 
populations were confronted with German conditions. But even in Belgium and France, 
drops would be of the order of 25 percentage points.  
Undoubtedly, part of the differences in homeownership rates for households of 
given characteristics and observed attitudes has to do with culture: e.g., the importance 
attributed to homeownership, or to providing housing gifts to children when they marry. 
Another part could be due to differential transactions costs, tax treatments, and credit 
market conditions across Europe. This is indeed suggested by the high transactions costs 
in Germany and the inability of owners-occupiers to deduct mortgage interest, unlike 
what applies to owners who rent to others. As mentioned above, it is not clear if these two 
parts are conceptually distinct. Policies need to be acceptable given cultural 
predispositions of the electorate; and long-standing policies or features of the housing and 
employment markets may promote a particular ‘culture’ with respect to housing (e.g. a 
tendency to accumulate housing and give housing gifts to children). When there is   14
substantial interaction between culture, institutions, and policies, progress towards 
integration is likely to be slower and more cumbersome.  
Our findings for private business ownership suggest greater similarity of market 
conditions in Europe. Coefficient effects are insignificant in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
France, Greece, and England; and relatively small when significant. Except for Austrians, 
other populations with significant effects would experience lower average estimated 
probabilities of participation if exposed to German conditions. Covariate effects are also 
small or insignificant.
20 
All in all, we find that although US regions do not provide complete uniformity in 
market conditions favoring ownership of different assets, European differences are 
quantitatively larger for stockholding and home ownership, though often not for private 
business ownership. In some cases, we also find that population characteristics differ in 
ways that matter, statistically and quantitatively, for differences in asset ownership. 
 
4.  Levels of Asset Holdings  
We turn now to real, PPP-adjusted levels of asset holdings across the thirteen 
countries and ask whether market conditions in some countries (regions) are conducive to 
larger holdings. We study the entire distribution of holdings across the asset holder pool 
in each country, and are thus able to examine whether market conditions facing relatively 
small holders show greater similarity across countries compared to conditions facing 
large holders. We consider the same reference countries or regions as for participation.  
 
   15
4.1  Estimation Model and Methodology 
We employ a variant of a technique proposed by Mata and Machado (2005), based on 
quantile regressions.
21 We first estimate nineteen vectors j  of quantile regression 
coefficients at every 5
th percentile, j θ , of the distribution of the asset in the base country: 
[ ] ( ) j
base base base base base
j b X X y Q θ θ = |       (2) 
We control for the same set of regressors as in the participation probit described in 
Section 3.1. Table A.2 presents sets of median regression estimates, by asset, for the three 
reference countries or regions: US, used for US-Europe comparisons; MW, used for 
within-US comparisons; and Germany, used for comparisons across Europe. 
We then make m random draws, with replacement, of characteristics and 
corresponding weights from the European country i, where m is the number of owners of 
the asset in question in the sample from country i. This process is repeated nineteen 
times. Each outcome of these draws, containing m observations, is denoted by 
i
j X . We 
generate nineteen counterfactual samples of size m from the desired conditional 
distribution:  ( ) j
base i
j j b X y θ =
* . We use these values to generate the unconditional 
counterfactual distribution:  ( )
base ib X y f ;
* . Finally, for each of the three sequences of 
variables (log asset holdings in the ‘base’, in country i, and counterfactual values), we 
calculate percentiles using population weights.  
The decomposition can be represented as:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } ( ) ( ) { }
i Base i Base i Base i Base y f b X y f b X y f y f y f y f − + − = − ; ;
* *       (3) 
The densities without asterisk represent the actual levels of the asset in question across 
their distribution among owners. The starred density is the counterfactual we construct.
22    16
In interpreting this decomposition, we can think of starting with the distribution of 
asset holdings in a particular country or region i and comparing it to what would have 
been observed if the population of asset holders were confronted with the same market 
conditions facing asset holders in the base country. The resulting difference (in the 
second bracket) represents these coefficient effects. We also compare the counterfactual 
to the actual density in the base country. This difference (in the first bracket) represents 
covariate effects, i.e. those attributable to differences in configuration of characteristics 
between holders of this asset in country or region i and in the ‘base’. 
We also compute and present confidence bands for covariate and coefficient effects 
based on bootstrapped standard errors. To construct them, we first derive one hundred 
bootstrapped samples from the base sample of asset holders used in step 1. We then 
derive nineteen vectors of QR estimates using each of these bootstrapped samples. Then, 
by repeating the process described above one hundred times, we generate a series of one 
hundred bootstrapped counterfactual distributions and use them to derive standard errors.  
We have performed several robustness checks, which have yielded results consistent 
with those presented here (details can be found in Appendix 2). An issue of potential 
concern is selectivity and its possible effects on the estimates of the covariate and 
coefficient effects. Given the lack of a generally accepted method of handling selectivity 
in quantile regression, we examined whether decompositions of mean differences in asset 
levels are sensitive to selectivity. Specifically, we applied the selectivity-corrected 
decompositions proposed by Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) and found that they give quite 
similar results to decompositions of mean differences that ignore selectivity (see   17
Appendix 2 for a fuller discussion). Thus, we doubt that our main conclusions in this 
paper are affected by this issue. 
 
4.2  Europe versus the US 
4.2.1  Direct and Indirect Stockholding 
Figure 4 shows coefficient and covariate effects for stockholding levels. US 
stockholders hold greater amounts of stock wealth across the distribution of stock 
holdings compared to any European country (except for Switzerland). With some 
exceptions (Sweden and Spain), counterfactual decompositions show that this difference 
across the board is basically attributable to coefficient effects, with covariate effects close 
to zero. This means that, given their characteristics, European stockholders would 
achieve considerably higher levels of stock holdings if they were confronted with US 
market conditions. Sweden, still exhibits significant coefficient effects in this direction, 
but most of its observed difference in stockholding levels relative to the US is attributable 
to the characteristics of its stockholder pool. This is not a trivial consequence of the fact 
that stock market participation is more widespread in Sweden than in the US, and thus 
Swedish stockholders are less of a selected group than the US ones. In Denmark, 
participation is also greater than in the US, but coefficient effects dominate. In fact, 
coefficient effects are particularly large in Denmark, Austria, and Greece, which exhibit 
quite different participation rates. On the other hand, Switzerland represents the only 
country with insignificant coefficient effects across most of the percentiles. 
Our findings seem quite consistent with World Bank and other indicators related to 
equity markets (Table 2). Denmark, Austria and Greece exhibit the three lowest scores in   18
terms of the World Bank stock market size indicator, which allows for market 
capitalization, value traded and turnover ratios. At the other extreme, Switzerland ranks at 
the top of this index. Low stockholding levels are observed in countries exhibiting poor 
institutional characteristics, such as high transactions costs and limited shareholder rights, 
rather than being closely linked to properties of stock returns (as reflected in the volatility 
and market stability measures). 
Estimated coefficient effects in Belgium, and Austria clearly diminish at the upper 
end. This suggests that the larger stockowners in those two countries and US owners of 
given characteristics have stock holdings closer in value compared to how close the 
holdings of small holders are, for given characteristics. The opposite is true in Spain, 
Italy, (and to a lesser extent, France and Greece). There, coefficient effects show a 
tendency to increase as we move across the distribution of stock holdings, implying that 
large US stockholders of similar characteristics to large European holders end up holding 
substantially larger real amounts in stocks. 
 
4.2.2  Private Businesses 
  Figure 5 shows observed differences and counterfactual decompositions for private 
business holdings among older households holding them. US households typically invest 
lower real amounts in private businesses across the entire distribution of such holdings. 
Most of the difference can be accounted for by differences in market conditions, with 
hardly any role for differences in characteristics of holders. If European private business 
holders were faced with US markets conditions, they would be holding lower amounts.    19
  Differences with US holdings are not noticeable in Spain and Greece.
23 While Spain 
fails to exhibit significant coefficient or covariate effects, Greece is seen to have market 
conditions that favor larger holdings, but these are neutralized by covariate effects 
pushing in the opposite direction. England represents the only case where business 
holders (except for those at the top of the distribution) would hold higher amounts if they 
were faced with US market conditions. The size of coefficient effects diminishes as we 
move across the distribution of holdings, and is hardly noticeable for the largest holders. 
  Interestingly, findings on relative sizes of business holdings go in the opposite 
direction from results on participation rates: while it is easier to do business in the US 
(Table 3), those who do business there end up investing smaller amounts than most 
Europeans with similar characteristics. As discussed already in the participation section, 
Table 3 shows that the US does not rank at the top in several indicators of ease of doing 
business. Table 5 additionally shows that eight of the European countries considered rank 
above the US in terms of the overall quality of governance indicator. The complete 
reversal of the ranking between participation and size may reflect a tendency of many 
older households in the US to set up businesses mainly for tax reasons. 
 
4.2.3  Value of Main Residence 
Figure 6 shows differences in real gross values of another real asset, primary 
residence, between the US and European countries. As for private businesses, the overall 
picture is one of higher real, PPP-adjusted values in Europe than in the US. US 
homeowners invest larger amounts in the house only when compared to Swedish or 
Greek households at similar points in the distribution of home values. Differences are   20
negligible when US homeowners are compared to Denmark or Spain.  
Coefficient effects present an even starker picture than differences in observed values. 
In most countries considered and throughout the distribution of home values, European 
homeowners invest in the primary residence larger real amounts than US homeowners of 
similar characteristics.
24 Covariate effects are either insignificant or imply a configuration 
of characteristics in the US that is conducive to larger holdings than that in the European 
country considered. To be sure, Table 6 illustrates that larger real holdings do not 
represent, on average, larger homes in Europe than in the US: there is a quantum leap in 
average size of dwelling when crossing the Atlantic. Europeans simply tie up larger real 
amounts in their primary residence compared to US homeowners of similar 
characteristics and position in the distribution of home values. 
We view this as an intriguing finding unlikely to have a simple explanation, primarily 
because of how widespread the tendency is for Europeans to have larger holdings. It 
seems unlikely that the difference is simply price-related. While there are areas in the US 
where land is abundant and house prices relatively low, the data include also homeowners 
from the W and the NE, where land is highly priced. While there are countries in Europe 
with particular land shortage (such as the Netherlands), and a number of countries that 
have experienced strong booms in real housing prices (especially Spain, UK, and Italy), 
the finding applies even to Germany, with stagnant or even declining house prices.  
Another possibility would be a uniformly more favorable tax treatment of housing in 
Europe. However, Table 7, which gives details on the taxation of residential property, 
does not suggest a favorable treatment, except perhaps in terms of not taxing capital 
gains, but again this applies only to some European countries. Paying larger amounts for   21
the house (given household resources) is also unlikely to be linked to greater availability 
of large mortgages in Europe: loan to value ratios in mortgage markets are generally 
lower - or at least no higher - in Europe compared to the US (Table 8). Finally, the 
possibility that the European preference for real assets is linked to bequest motives or 
receipts of housing gifts or inheritance that tend to be more widespread in Europe than in 
the US is weakened by the fact that we are already controlling for survey responses 
indicating the probability to leave a bequest. Greater prevalence of such factors would 
thus be captured in the configuration of covariates, which is kept constant when deriving 
coefficient effects. Covariate effects imply that the pool of US homeowners has 
characteristics that are either quite similar to those of Europeans or even conducive to 
larger home values than the pool of European homeowners.
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4.3  Integration within the US 




th percentiles located in four regions of the US. The W and NE clearly dominate in 
terms of amounts held in stocks, while the W exhibits the highest values of the primary 
residence, with NE as second. The MW dominates in values of private businesses.  
Table 9 reports counterfactual decompositions at three indicative percentiles of the 
distribution of log differences in asset holdings: 25
th, 50
th, and 75
th. For stockholding, 
coefficient effects are largely insignificant, suggesting that households located in 
different regions of the US face similar market conditions. We find greater incidence of 
statistically significant coefficient effects for private businesses and even more so for 
primary residence where they span all percentiles considered. Indeed, coefficient effects   22
can largely explain regional differences across the distribution of home values, with 
covariate effects making a statistically and quantitatively significant contribution only in 
the S. These findings are consistent with indicators of housing market conditions, such as 
lower prices and higher vacancy rates in the MW and in the S (Table 10). 
The pattern of significance for coefficient effects seems quite consistent with what one 
would expect to hold across regions of a large, federal country. With regard to 
stockholding (and in view also of the well-known home equity bias), US households face 
essentially the same stock market but what can differ is their ease of access to stocks 
(e.g., through financial institutions, mutual funds, or brokers). At the opposite extreme is 
housing: those with primary residence in a particular region face the local housing market 
conditions. In order for these to be similar across regions, households need to be willing 
and able to move to where the housing market offers better terms. Even if the policy and 
institutional framework governing housing markets were fully harmonized across states, 
differences could still arise because of differential employment opportunities; or of 
differential quality of factors complementary to housing (e.g. school quality). It is also 
sensible that market conditions governing private business holdings turn out to be less 
integrated than those for stockholding and more integrated than housing. This market is 
less segmented than the housing market, because a household does not need to own a 
private business where its members want to live. However, supervision, control, and any 
participation in the management of the private business are considerably facilitated by 
geographical proximity. This results in some market segmentation, the effects of which 
show up in our findings. 
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4.4  Integration within Europe 
The bottom panel of Table 1 reports PPP-adjusted, real asset holdings in European 
countries. Table 9 decomposes (log) differences in observed amounts for each asset class 
into coefficient and covariate effects, using Germany as the base country. Stocks were the 
asset for which coefficient effects were largely insignificant within the US, but this is not 
the case for Europe. The vast majority of countries exhibit strongly significant effects, 
both statistically and economically. Very few covariate effects turn out to be significant, 
all in favor of the German stockholder pool being conducive to larger holdings. 
Our US results above suggest that fully integrated stock markets do not lead to strong 
coefficient effects when comparing households in different locations. Strong coefficient 
effects for financial assets suggest that European households neither invest in the same 
stock market nor do they consider the full spectrum of European markets as equally 
accessible to them. This European home equity bias (even after the adoption of the euro) 
is noteworthy, as it does not seem to be confined to small holders: coefficient effects tend 
not to disappear at the upper end of the distribution. 
For private businesses, we find strongly statistically significant coefficient effects 
across Europe at the upper part of the distribution, and fewer such effects at the median 
and bottom part. This pattern of statistical significance is exactly the opposite of what we 
found for the US where coefficient effects suggest that large, rather than small or median, 
business holders face similar conditions regardless of location.   
Finally, and consistent with the US, coefficient effects for home values are 
statistically significant across the distribution. However, their estimated size and sign 
exhibit much greater variation across European countries. This is so, even though   24
Germany has the lowest homeownership rate in the group and one might suppose a priori 
that it offers uniformly less favorable conditions to homeowners. A number of significant 
covariate effects have to do with homeowner characteristics in Europe. For countries in 
southern Europe, Austria and England they are only significant for small homeowners, 
but for other countries they are only significant for large homeowners.  
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have used recently available, internationally comparable data across 
thirteen countries to document and study sources of differences in portfolios of older 
households, across the Atlantic, within the US, and within Europe. We focused on the 
question of whether households of given characteristics tend to have similar patterns of 
asset market participation and of asset holdings across these countries. We applied 
counterfactual analysis to the asset market behavior of households with mature portfolios 
in order to provide a fresh perspective on economic integration, complementary to 
existing studies based on international flows, prices, and risk sharing.  
Our findings suggest that households of given characteristics tend to have quite 
different probabilities of participating in a given asset, and also quite different real, PPP-
adjusted asset holdings, both across the Atlantic and within Europe. In most cases, 
participation probabilities are greater in the US than in Europe. However, the same is not 
true of levels of asset holdings. European asset owners tend to hold smaller real amounts 
in stocks and larger amounts in real assets (private businesses and primary residence) 
than US households at comparable positions of the distribution of holdings, even after 
controlling for any differences in the configurations of characteristics in the asset holder   25
pools. This pattern emerges clearly in many facets of our analysis, seems worthy of future 
investigation and is unlikely to have a simple explanation. In most cases, international 
differences in the configuration of asset holder pools play minimal or no role in 
generating observed differences in asset holdings. Moreover, differences in market 
conditions are substantially more pronounced among European countries than among US 
regions, suggesting a substantial potential for further integration. 
Our analysis is positive rather than normative. Finding differences in market 
conditions does not necessarily imply that these differences should be eliminated through 
institutional reform and policy harmonization. Promoting participation in, or large 
holdings of, a particular type of asset can be a political choice on the part of certain 
governments or societies. Our findings provide a check on consistency between stated 
objectives and market conditions. However, our findings do not seem consistent with the 
notion that European households are already citizens of a Europe-wide (let alone 
transatlantic) ‘village’ facing similar economic environments, policies and constraints 
regardless of the country in which they reside.  
Our study could encourage work in several directions. The pattern of coefficient 
effects between Europe and the US, signaling reversals between financial and real assets, 
as well as the pattern for smaller country groups present interesting challenges for future 
research. The approach to integration in terms of household asset market behavior, which 
we have introduced in this paper, can in principle be applied to a range of assets and 
debts; to different countries (for example, comparable surveys are currently designed or 
collected in Japan, Korea, China and India) and/or demographic groups of interest. 
Finally, counterfactual distributions can be applied to various areas of household finance.   26
Appendix 1: Probit and Quantile Regressions 
 
Counterfactual analysis of participation is based on probit regressions for participation in 
the base country or region. Participation probits for the US, the Midwest, and Germany 
are presented in Table A.1. Counterfactual analysis of amounts held is based on quantile 
regressions for the base country or region. As an example, Table A.2 lists results for 
median regressions. 
 
Appendix 2: Robustness Exercises 
 
We have performed a variety of checks for robustness. First, we have estimated different 
specifications of the quantile regression models estimated in the base country or region 
(US, Germany and MW). In particular, we have experimented with specifications that use 
a non-linear (inverse hyperbolic sine) continuous transformation of income and wealth 
variables instead of quartiles and the patterns derived are similar to those we present.
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Second, we evaluated alternative counterfactual distributions that combine the 
configuration of characteristics of asset holders in the base country with the coefficients 
on those characteristics estimated for each comparison country or region i. This reverses 
the order of the decomposition in Section 4.1 in the following way:  
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	  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     (4) 
 
In the Mata-Machado decomposition, the relative contribution of coefficient and 
covariate effects can vary depending on the choice of base. A general way to address this 
problem is to use the Shorrocks-Shapley generalization (Shorrocks, 1999), according to 
which coefficient and covariate effects can be derived as averages of effects calculated 
from both possible choices. We have estimated coefficient and covariate effects 
according to the Shapley-Shorrocks generalization and the decomposition in (4) and they 
are both similar to those we present, with differences appearing only at high and low 
quantiles of business holdings. It is likely that these differences are due to the small 
samples of business owners in all European countries (less than 150 observations). 
 
Third, we have implemented the original Mata-Machado decomposition
27: 
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Again, coefficient and covariate effects are qualitatively similar to the ones we present. 
 
Finally, we investigate the potential effects of selectivity in the counterfactual 
decompositions we present. To the best of our knowledge, the only method that corrects 
quantile regression estimates for selectivity is due to Buchinsky (1998). In his method 
however, identification of the constant term (which is necessary for our decompositions)   27
rests on the assumption that there is a subset of observations for which participation 
probability is very close to one. Unfortunately, there is no such subset of observations for 
any of the assets we consider, and thus we perform our quantile regression without taking 
selectivity into account.  
 
In order to investigate the effects of ignoring selectivity, we examine its effects on 
the coefficient and covariate effects at the mean instead of different quantiles. To this 
end, we estimate coefficient and covariate effects from a standard Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition (see Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973)) and we compare them with those 
derived from decompositions computed after taking into account selectivity through a 
Heckman-type model. There are various such decompositions (for a detailed discussion, 
see Neuman and Oaxaca, 2004). We choose the decomposition that corresponds to eqn. 
14 in Neuman and Oaxaca (2004), which represents the most encompassing view for 
integration in the sense that country differences in the estimated parameters from the 
asset ownership equation and differences in the effects of selectivity in the amounts 
invested are viewed as reflecting lack of integration. On the other hand, differences in the 
configuration of characteristics determining asset ownership are treated as covariate 
effects. We perform selectivity–corrected decompositions only for holdings of stocks and 
the main home, since we find no evidence of selectivity for private business holdings.  
 
Following the notation in Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) the conditional expectation 
of the asset amount among owners derived from a Heckman-type model is equal to
28: 
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' + = =              (6) 
where L is an index of participation,  X  denotes the mean of X,  ˆ λ  is an estimate of the 
mean (inverse) Mill’s ratio evaluated from the asset participation stage, and  ˆ θ  is its 
estimated coefficient. Then, we perform the following two decompositions:  
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where  i
0 ˆ λ  represents the mean value of the inverse Mill’s ratio if households in country i 
faced the same coefficients for participation in a given asset category as households in the 
base country. The decomposition in (7) is the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder one and thus 
does not take into account selectivity, while the one in (8) does. Results are summarized 
in Table A.3, and we observe that accounting for selectivity has practically no impact on 
the estimates of the covariate and coefficient effects. These findings lead us to believe 
that our counterfactual decompositions using quantile regressions are unlikely to be 
affected by the omission of any correction for selectivity.    28
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Table 1: Asset ownership rates and levels by asset quartiles 
 
   NET WORTH    STOCKS     OWN BUSINESS    HOME 
 Quantiles    Quantiles among 








 25  50  75 
Ownership 
Rate (%) 
25 50  75   
Ownership 
Rate (%) 
25 50  75 
Ownership 
Rate (%) 
25 50 75 
                                                            
United 
States  13,073   40.0  162.1 437.0  49.7 11.0  49.5  169.0    9.8 40.0  100.0 350.0  77.3  80.0  150.0  250.0 
Midwest 3,170    52.0  178.2 428.1   54.5  10.0  45.0  150.2   13.8  50.0  150.0 400.0  80.9  82.0 132.0 200.0 
Northeast 2,125    39.7  193.5 475.9   54.7  11.0  52.0  172.5   6.8  40.0  100.0 300.0  70.6  92.0 190.0 340.0 
South 5,138    29.9  113.0 326.0   42.6  10.0  43.9  153.0   9.3  25.0 90.0  250.0  78.3  63.0 100.0 180.0 
West 2,399    53.0  228.5 582.0   52.1  14.0  53.3  182.5   8.6  30.0  100.0 300.0  76.9  140.0 250.0 400.0 
                                 
Europe 25,394    31.5  166.0 371.2   26.3  5.0  16.9  52.7   6.3  58.6  165.1 562.5  68.3  112.5  195.2  314.6 
Sweden 2,140    24.6  98.2  238.2   71.1  4.1  13.1  38.4   12.8  31.8  153.5 507.8  69.0  51.2 102.3  163.7 
Denmark 1,176    28.5  147.5 334.8   56.0  2.8  9.2  31.1   9.5  52.7  340.4 556.0  69.0  90.8 141.8  226.9 
Germany 2,002    13.3  110.9 322.1   24.1  4.7  16.2  52.4   6.3  77.1  209.7 1,304.9  51.1  154.1  209.7  314.6 
Netherlands 1,954   11.0  144.7 367.0   24.0 7.6  24.8  88.5   6.7  101.2  333.9 1,489.3  55.3  192.3  263.1  384.5 
Belgium 2,532    102.2  224.8 473.8   37.5  6.3  32.7  138.5   5.4  146.4  308.3 770.8  80.0  127.4 178.3 256.9 
France 2,110    57.5  208.1 489.9   42.9  4.7  18.2  55.0   5.9  66.0  180.2 311.9  72.2  125.1  200.3  325.1 
Switzerland 712   41.7  234.6 632.3   35.7  11.2  35.7  118.8   10.8  62.5  206.6 982.7  55.1 253.6  357.0  561.1 
Austria 1,409    10.3  119.0 287.5   9.8  4.9  14.0  44.7   4.1  80.6  113.3 164.0  56.6  108.0  194.4  324.0 
Italy 1,778    44.0  164.0 345.4   10.1  7.9  20.3  42.2   6.4  67.1  116.2 562.5  75.2  111.2  168.7  314.4 
Spain 1,753    74.3  170.8 366.8   11.1  5.5  14.6  30.5   7.0  51.1  116.5 232.4  86.9  85.4 146.4  244.1 
Greece 1,982    57.3  124.1 245.7   10.6  2.7  7.9  20.6   6.8  37.6  124.1 236.7  84.3  62.0 99.3 186.1 
England 5,721    75.7  257.4 443.3   39.4  4.6  15.6  52.1   2.5  6.1 38.3 268.1  76.1  191.5  275.7  398.3 
                                      
                                                            
Notes: Weighted statistics using 2004 HRS, SHARE and ELSA data. All amounts are in thousand of PPP-adjusted dollars. PPP exchange rates are taken from the Penn World Tables, 
version 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006)   33






































Expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
                    
Austria  5.3 5.3 10.0  34.0 29.6  3.5  8.2  2  486  5.5 
Belgium  6.4 5.1 19.3  14.9 219.6  2.6  20.1  0  458  5.8 
Denmark  6.3 5.0 16.0  71.4 62.3  3.3  40.1  2  89  5.3 
France  6.6 4.7 22.8  81.7 92.7  3.9  65.5  3  430  6.3 
Germany  6.5 4.3 27.1 123.7 44.0  5.3  51.8  1  455  6.1 
Greece  5.6 5.2 15.8  37.5 61.6  3.1  21.4  2  180  4.1 
Italy  6.5 5.0 17.7 114.5 47.2  1.5  48.1  1  478  4.3 
Netherlands  7.3 4.6 23.8 108.8  107.8  2.5  104.7  2  739  6.3 
Spain  7.7 4.9 18.8 143.3 94.9  1.5  120.5  4  348  3.7 
Sweden  7.6 4.8 23.1 123.7  108.8  4.1  119.1  3  764  7.4 
Switzerland  9.0 4.8 19.4  93.7 229.7  2.2  202.3  2  498  7.5 
UK  8.6 5.0 18.3 140.5  131.5  6.3  173.2  5  473  7.3 
USA  8.3 5.0 18.2 126.5  139.9  1.3  165.9  5  630  8.8 
                                
 
Notes: For columns 2-7: World Bank, data for 2004. Equity Market - Size Index: A composite index on equity market size is created on the basis of (1) market capitalization 
to GDP, (2) value traded to GDP and (3) turnover ratio. Each of the above component indicators are standardized by subtracting the median of the distribution of the 
variable and scaling by the standard deviation of the variable. Equity Market - Stability Index: A composite index on equity market stability is created on the basis of (1) 
skewness, (2) volatility of market returns. Each of the above component indicators are standardized by subtracting the median of the distribution of the variable and scaling 
by the standard deviation of the variable. Equity Return Volatility (%): Volatility is the standard deviation of the market index returns. This measure is annualized to give a 
measure of the annual volatility. Volatility is reported as three year moving averages. (Source: Datastream and Emerging Market Database). Equity Market Turnover Ratio 
(%): The indicator is defined as the total value of shares traded during the period divided by the average market capitalization for the period. Average market capitalization 
is calculated as the average of the end-of-period values for the current period and the previous period (Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators).  Number of 
Listed Firms: The indicator is defined as the number of the domestically incorporated companies listed on the country's stock exchanges at the end of the year (Source: 
World Development Indicators). Market Cap to GDP Ratio (%): The indicator is defined as the ratio of market capitalization to GDP (Source: World Development 
Indicators). Trade Volume to GDP ratio (%): Stock Traded to GDP is the total value traded divided by GDP. Value traded is the total value of shares traded during the 
period ( Source: World Development Indicators). Column 8: Shareholder rights: an index computed by La Porta et al. (1998) aggregating the shareholder rights (“anti-
director rights”). The index is formed by adding 1 when: (1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit 
their shares prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (4) an 
oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is 
less than or equal to 10 percent (the sample median); or (6) shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waved by a shareholders’ vote. The index ranges from 0 to 
6. Columns 9-10: 2005 Data. (Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2007) 
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US  3 3  18 1  10 7 5  55  10  4 16 
UK  5 8  42  16  19 1 9  11  14  22  10 
Denmark  7 15 8  14  31 19 18  19  3  1  24 
Sweden  14 20 17  95  6  33 114  37  9  2  17 
Switzerland  16 30 36  23  11  19 156 7  47  9  32 
Belgium  20 41 43  41  157 41 12 62  38 21  9 
Germany  21 53 30 129  33  3  81 70  6  29  29 
Netherlands  22 42 81  86  20  13 96 81  16 30  8 
Austria  30 68 45 104  26  19 141  102  13 14  19 
Spain  38 94 54 163  36  19 81  103  24 41  15 
France  47 12 34 135  158 96 58 92  81 17  31 
Italy  69 46  109  102  50  41 81  112  103  147 43 
Greece  111 134  53  166  146  76  156 100  119  48  33 
                                   
 
Notes: World Bank, Doing Business (http://www.doingbusiness.org), rankings for 2005. The ease of doing business index is calculated as the ranking on the simple 
average of country percentile rankings on each of the 10 topics covered in Doing Business. The ranking on each topic is the simple average of the percentile rankings on 
its component indicators. Starting a business: Procedures, time, cost and paid-in minimum capital to open a new business. Dealing with licenses: Procedures, time and 
cost of business inspections and licensing (construction industry). Employing workers: Difficulty of hiring index, rigidity of hours index, difficulty of firing index and 
firing cost. Registering property: Procedures, time and cost to register commercial real estate. Getting credit: Strength of legal rights index, depth of credit information 
index. Protecting investors: Indices of the extent of disclosure, extent of director liability and ease of shareholder suits. Paying taxes: Number of tax payments, time to 
prepare tax returns and total taxes as a share of commercial profits. Trading across borders: Documents, time and cost to export and import. Enforcing contracts: 
Procedures, time and cost to resolve a commercial dispute. Closing a business: Recovery rate in bankruptcy.   35
 
Table 4: Decompositions of Differences in Asset Ownership Rates within the US and Europe 
 
Stocks   Own  Business    Home 
Country/  
























                            
US Northeast  -0.002  -0.020  0.019 ***   0.070 0.052 ***  0.019 ***   0.102 0.066 *** 0.037 ***
US South  0.119 0.083 *** 0.036 *** 0.045 0.028 ***  0.018 *** 0.025 -0.016   0.041 ***
US West  0.025 0.024 *  0.001     0.053 0.041 ***  0.012 ***   0.041 0.021  0.020 ***
                              
Sweden  -0.469 -0.461 *** -0.008    -0.065 -0.073 ***  0.008    -0.178 -0.209 *** 0.030 * 
Denmark  -0.318 -0.279 *** -0.039 ***   -0.032 -0.033 ***  0.001    -0.178 -0.180 *** 0.001  
Netherlands  0.001 -0.003   0.004    -0.004 -0.012   0.007    -0.042 -0.106 *** 0.064 ***
Belgium  -0.133 -0.138 *** 0.004    0.009 0.002  0.007     -0.289 -0.274 *** -0.015  
France  -0.187 -0.208 *** 0.020    0.004 -0.007   0.011 *    -0.211 -0.239 *** 0.029 * 
Switzerland  -0.116 -0.093 *** -0.023    -0.046 -0.052 ***  0.006    -0.040 -0.051 * 0.011  
Austria  0.144 0.140 *** 0.004     0.021 0.020 ***  0.001     -0.055 -0.099 *** 0.044 ***
Italy  0.140 0.091 *** 0.049 **    -0.001 -0.021 * 0.020 *    -0.241 -0.277 *** 0.036  
Spain  0.131 0.065 **  0.066 **    -0.007 -0.036 ***  0.029 **    -0.358 -0.431 *** 0.074 ** 
Greece  0.135 0.117 *** 0.018     -0.005 -0.007   0.002    -0.332 -0.357 *** 0.025  
England  -0.153 -0.154 *** 0.001    0.038 0.007  0.031 ***   -0.249 -0.330 *** 0.081 ** 
                                                   
                                
Notes: All decompositions for US regions refer to differences with respect to the Midwest, while for European countries to differences with respect to Germany. 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors have been computed using 200 bootstrap replications.   36
 
Table 5: Indicators of Governance 
 
Percentile 





  Percentile 





  Percentile 





  Percentile 




Score  Country 
(0-100)     (-2.5 to 
+2.5)   (0-100)    (-2.5 to 
+2.5)   (0-100)    (-2.5 to 
+2.5)   (0-100)    (-2.5 to 
+2.5) 
             
Austria  95.2    1.81 91.7 1.49 80.8 0.97 97.1 2.13 
Belgium  92.4    1.51 90.7 1.43 70.7 0.78 91.7 1.51 
Denmark  98.1    1.97 97.1 1.79 83.7 1.03  99  2.42 
France  91.4    1.41 83.4 1.16 63.5 0.51 90.3 1.39 
Germany  93.3    1.73 90.2 1.42 67.8 0.69 93.2  1.9 
Greece  73.8    0.81 76.6 0.87 60.1  0.4  70.9 0.55 
Italy  68.6    0.65  80  1.05 57.2 0.27 71.4 0.56 
Netherlands 94.3    1.77 97.6 1.81 80.3 0.95 95.1 2.04 
Spain  87.1    1.2 87.3  1.31  57.7 0.3 89.8  1.39 
Sweden  96.7    1.87 96.1 1.73 93.3 1.31 97.6 2.17 
Switzerland 99.5    1.98 93.7 1.58 94.2 1.33 96.6 2.12 
UK  93.8    1.73 96.6 1.76 59.6  0.4  94.2 1.99 
US  91.9    1.48 91.2 1.47 52.9 0.12 92.7 1.76 
                                         
 
Notes: Information taken from Kaufmann et al. (2007). The governance indicators presented here aggregate the views on the quality of governance provided by a 
large number of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and developing countries. These data are gathered from a number of survey 
institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. 
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Table 6: Housing Size 
 
Country Year  Average m
2 for 
total dwellings 
    
Austria  2004 97 
Denmark  2005
a 111 
France  2002 90 
Germany  2002 90 
Italy  2001 92 
Spain  2001 93 
UK  2003 85 
US  2003 165 
        
 
Notes: Data from United Nations Statistics. a) Data refer to 
average living floor space. 
   38
Table 7: Taxation of residential property 
 





Taxed     interest  principal 
payment  
Capital gains on 
housing assets taxable Inheritance tax  Stamp duty 
                
   Y     Y   
 Austria     N   
   (up to ceiling)   
 N   
 (if sold <10 years)   
 Y    6% 
                
 Y       Y     Y     Y     10%-12.5%   
 (with fixed       (up to imputed     (within    (if sold < 5 years)     (5%-6% for modest     Belgium   
 deduction)       rental income)     limit)     POOD are exempt   
 Y   
 houses)   
                
   Y    1.50% 
 Denmark     Y   
 
 Y     n.a.  
 POOD are exempt   
 Y   
 total trading costs 7.2%  
                
   Y     Y   
   (if sold <10 years)     (lower than for     Germany     N   
 
 N     N   
 POOD are exempt     financial assets)   
3.50% 
                
 Y       Y   
 Greece     (for 
POOD)       (for POOD)   
 n.a.    N     Y     11%-13%   
                
   Y   
 France     N   
 
 N     N   
 POOD are exempt   
 Y     2%-3%   
                
 N       Y     Y    10% 
 Italy     (for 
POOD)       (for POOD)   
 N   
 (50% for POOD)   
 Y (until 2001)   
 (3% for POOD)   
                
   Y   
   (above tax free     
Netherlands    Y   
 
 Y     N     N   
 threshold)   
6% 
                
 N       Y   
 Spain     (for 
POOD)     
 Y     Y   
 (exempt if reinvested)  
 Y     n.a.   
                
 Sweden     Y       Y     N       Y     Y     1.5%-3%   
                
   Y     Y     Y   
   (up to total     (cantonal only)     (cantonal only)   
   property 
income     POOD are exempt        Switzerland    Y   
   + fixed 
amount)   
 N   
     
 n.a.   
                
   Y     1%, 2% or 4%   
UK   N   
 
 N     N   
 POOD are exempt   
 Y   
 (depends on house value)  
                
   Y     Y (until 2002)     Y   
   (up to ceiling)     (deduction for POOD   (to be phased out)   US   N   
    
 N   
 if held >2 years)      
 n.a   
                         
 
Notes: Information taken from Catte et al. (2004). POOD = principal owner-occupied dwellings.   39

















          
 F(75%)   
 M(19%)     Belgium   31% 72%    80-85% 
 V(6%)   
20 
          
Germany  52% 39%    ≈70%    Mainly F and  M    ≤30   
          
 F (75%)   
 M (10%)    Denmark  67% 59%  80% 
 V (15%)   
30 
          
 F(5%)   
 M(15%)    Greece  21% 80%    70-80% 
 V(80%)   
 15-20   
          
 V(≥75%)    Spain  46% 85%    ≈80%    Rest mainly M     15-25   
          
 F/M/Other(86%)    France  26% 58%  80%  V(14%)    15 
          
 F(28%)    Italy  15% 69%  50%   Rest mainly M     10-25  
          
 F(74%)   
 M(19%)    Netherlands  111% 53%  112% 
 V(7%)   
10 
          
 F(75%)    Austria  20% 56%  60%  V(25%)     20-30  
          
 M(28%)     UK    73% 70%  70%  V(72%)    25 
          
 F(85%)     US    69% 69%  80%  M(15%)    30 
                 
 
Notes: Information taken from Calza et al. (2007). * Share of owner-occupied 
dwelling. ** Estimated average loan-to-value ratio on new mortgage loans. *** 
Breakdown of new loans by type. Fixed (F): Interest rate fixed for more than 
five years or until expiry; Mixed (M): Interest rate fixed between one and five 
years; Variable (V): Interest rate renegotiable after one year or tied to market 
rates or adjustable at the discretion of the lender.    40
Table 9: Decompositions of Differences in Asset Distributions within the US and Europe 
 
25th Quantile    50th Quantile    75th Quantile 
Country/  
























                                                   
Panel A. Stocks 
                         
US Northeast  -0.095  0.111   -0.206 **    -0.145  -0.002  -0.142 *    -0.139  -0.001   -0.138 * 
US South  0.000  0.104   -0.104     0.025  0.027   -0.002    -0.019 0.054   -0.073  
US West  -0.337  0.080   -0.416 ***   -0.168  0.195 *** -0.363 ***  -0.195  0.142  * -0.337 ***
                              
Sweden  0.142  -0.736 ***  0.878 ***   0.214  -0.602 *** 0.816 ***  0.312 -0.485  *** 0.797 ***
Denmark  0.512  0.270 **  0.241     0.562  0.347 *** 0.214 *   0.521  0.318  ** 0.203  
Netherlands  -0.475  -0.741 ***  0.266     -0.427  -0.537 *** 0.111    -0.524  -0.711  *** 0.187  
Belgium  -0.284  -0.345 **  0.061     -0.705  -0.689 *** -0.015    -0.971  -1.050  *** 0.079  
France  0.014  -0.486 ***  0.500 ***   -0.118  -0.472 *** 0.354 ***  -0.048 -0.322  *** 0.274 * 
Switzerland  -0.866  -1.065 ***  0.198     -0.791  -0.816 *** 0.024    -0.818  -0.909  *** 0.091  
Austria  -0.048  0.213   -0.261     0.142  0.345 * -0.203    0.159  0.209    -0.051  
Italy  -0.512  -0.708 ***  0.196     -0.225  -0.343 ** 0.118     0.217  0.111    0.107  
Spain  -0.152  -0.566 **  0.415 *    0.100  -0.051  0.151     0.542  0.425  **  0.117  
Greece  0.565  0.187   0.379 **    0.723  0.407 *** 0.316 **   0.934  0.664  *** 0.271 * 
England  0.026  -0.322 **  0.348     0.035  -0.081  0.116     0.007  -0.103   0.110  
                              
Panel B. Own Business 
                         
US Northeast  0.223  0.309   -0.086     0.406  0.460 *** -0.054   0.288  0.341   -0.053  
US South  0.693  0.798 *** -0.105     0.511  0.514 *** -0.003   0.470  0.420  *** 0.050  
US West  0.511  0.653 **  -0.142     0.406  0.461 ** -0.056     0.288  0.325    -0.037  
                              
Sweden  0.885  0.774 ***  0.112     0.312  0.867 *** -0.555 **   0.944  1.737  *** -0.794 * 
Denmark  0.381  0.287   0.094     -0.484  -0.085  -0.399 *    0.853 1.355  *** -0.502  
Netherlands  -0.271  -0.316   0.044     -0.465  -0.115  -0.350    -0.132 0.300   -0.433  
Belgium  -0.641  -0.583 **  -0.058     -0.385  0.175  -0.560 ***   0.527 0.901  *** -0.374  
France  0.157  -0.002   0.159     0.152  0.489 ** -0.338     1.431  1.860  *** -0.429  
Switzerland  0.211  0.298   -0.087     0.015  0.428  -0.413 *    0.284 0.613  **  -0.329  
Austria  -0.044  -0.545 *  0.500 ***   0.616  0.257  0.359 *    2.074  1.739  *** 0.335  
Italy  0.140  0.405 *  -0.266 *    0.591  1.502 *** -0.912 ***  0.842  1.652  *** -0.810 * 
Spain  0.412  -0.020   0.432 *    0.588  0.926 *** -0.338   1.726  2.081  *** -0.356  
Greece  0.718  0.709 ***  0.009     0.525  0.817 *** -0.292   1.707  2.011  *** -0.304  
England  2.533  2.741 *** -0.208     1.700  2.026 *** -0.325   1.583  1.863  *** -0.280  
                              
Panel C. Home 
                         
US Northeast  -0.115  -0.088 **  -0.027     -0.364  -0.342 *** -0.022    -0.531  -0.502  *** -0.029  
US South  0.264  0.167 ***  0.097 ***   0.278  0.198 *** 0.080 ***  0.105  0.054  * 0.051 * 
US West  -0.535  -0.508 *** -0.027     -0.639  -0.617 *** -0.022    -0.693  -0.664  *** -0.029  
                              
Sweden  1.103  1.051 ***  0.052     0.718  0.744 *** -0.027   0.653  0.703  *** -0.050  
Denmark  0.529  0.467 ***  0.062     0.391  0.432 *** -0.041 **   0.327  0.380  *** -0.053 * 
Netherlands  -0.221  -0.264 ***  0.043     -0.227  -0.160 *** -0.066 ***  -0.201 -0.130  *** -0.070 ** 
Belgium  0.191  0.124 ***  0.066     0.162  0.215 *** -0.053 **   0.202  0.276  *** -0.073 ** 
France  0.209  0.106 ***  0.103 **    0.046  0.053   -0.007    -0.033  -0.019   -0.014  
Switzerland  -0.498  -0.444 *** -0.054     -0.532  -0.382 *** -0.150 ***  -0.579 -0.429  *** -0.149 ***
Austria  0.356  0.178 ***  0.178 ***   0.076  0.033   0.043 **   -0.030  -0.063  *** 0.033  
Italy  0.326  0.157 **  0.169 ***   0.217  0.138 *** 0.079 **   0.001  -0.033    0.034  
Spain  0.590  0.364 ***  0.226 ***   0.359  0.298 *** 0.061   0.254  0.274  *** -0.020  
Greece  0.910  0.739 ***  0.171 ***   0.748  0.708 *** 0.041   0.525  0.535  *** -0.010  
England  -0.217  -0.395 ***  0.178 ***   -0.274  -0.316 *** 0.042    -0.236  -0.170  *** -0.066  
                                                   
 
Notes: All decompositions for US regions refer to differences with respect to the Midwest, while for European countries 
to differences with respect to Germany. Quantiles are computed among owners of each asset. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Standard errors have been computed using 100 bootstrap replications.   41
Table 10: Housing Market Conditions by US Region in 2004 
 
Period US  Northeast Midwest South  West 
 
Panel A. Median Asking Sales Price (thousand dollars) 
          
1
st Quarter  126.7 232.1 111.0  111.7  183.6 
2
nd Quarter  124.7 125.0 128.8 99.2  192.3 
3
d Quarter  113.6 135.0 115.0 94.0  178.4 
4
th Quarter  121.8 123.5  82.9 122.9  206.2 
Annual  122.1 150.0 111.0  104.5  189.6 
          




st Quarter  1.7 0.9 2.1 2 1.3 
2
nd Quarter  1.7 1.1 1.7 2 1.4 
3
d Quarter  1.7 1.2 2.1  1.9  1.4 
4
th Quarter  1.8 1.2 2.2 2 1.5 
                 
 
Notes: Data taken from Current Population Survey/Housing Vacancy Survey, 
Series H-111, Bureau of the Census, Washington, DC.   42















Notes: All decompositions refer to differences from the US. The error bands reflect 95% 
confidence intervals.   43
 
 













Notes: All decompositions refer to differences from the US. The error bands reflect 95% 


















Notes: All decompositions refer to differences from the US. The error bands reflect 95% 
confidence intervals.   45
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Notes: The actual difference in the (log) stock wealth level, ‘Diff’, is decomposed at each percentile into two parts: 
one reflecting the effect of coefficients (‘Coeff’) and one due to the effect of covariates (‘Cov’). Dots represent 95% 
confidence bands derived using 100 bootstrap replications.   46
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Notes: The actual difference in the (log) business wealth level, ‘Diff’, is decomposed at each percentile into two 
parts: one reflecting the effect of coefficients (‘Coeff’) and one due to the effect of covariates (‘Cov’). Dots 
represent 95% confidence bands derived using 100 bootstrap replications.   47
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Notes: The actual difference in the (log) housing wealth level, ‘Diff’, is decomposed at each percentile into two 
parts: one reflecting the effect of coefficients (‘Coeff’) and one due to the effect of covariates (‘Cov’). Dots 
represent 95% confidence bands derived using 100 bootstrap replications.   48
 
Table A.1  Asset Ownership probit regressions for the US as whole, US Midwest and Germany 
 
STOCKS   OWN  BUSINESS   HOME 
United States    US Midwest  Germany  United States  US Midwest  Germany  United States  US Midwest  Germany  Variable 
Coeff. Std.  Error      Coeff.  Std. 
Error   Coeff. Std. 
Error   Coeff. Std. 
Error   Coeff. Std. 
Error   Coeff. Std. 
Error   Coeff. Std. 
Error   Coeff. Std. 
Error   Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
                                                               
Age   3.08  1.40  **  3.22 2.74    -2.53  4.90    -3.46  1.81 *   -0.39  3.25     10.12  8.65    13.99  1.41 ***  11.60  3.00 ***  17.77  4.49  *** 
Age squared  -1.84  1.02  *   -1.73  1.98    0.07 3.73    1.68 1.34    -0.31  2.39      -12.13 7.07 *    -10.19 1.00 ***  -8.87  2.11 ***   -12.53  3.32  *** 
Couple  0.05  0.04     0.12  0.09    0.11  0.16    0.40  0.06 ***  0.50  0.12  ***  0.22  0.22    0.73  0.04 ***  0.81  0.09 ***  0.32  0.14  *** 
Widow  -0.02  0.05     -0.02  0.10    -0.11  0.18    -0.03  0.07    -0.05  0.13     0.04 0.28     0.39 0.04 ***  0.52 0.09 ***  0.28 0.15  *** 
Never Married  0.08  0.07     0.17  0.15    0.16  0.19    0.00  0.10    -0.09  0.20     0.16  0.27    -0.06  0.06    0.02  0.13    -0.04  0.17   
Household Size  -0.11  0.01  ***   -0.10  0.03 ***  -0.09  0.05 *   -0.10  0.02 ***  -0.08  0.04  **  0.01 0.07    -0.05  0.01 ***  -0.02  0.03    0.16 0.06  *** 
High School 
Graduate 
0.53  0.04  ***   0.45  0.09 ***  0.09  0.18    0.17  0.06 ***  0.09  0.12     0.61  0.39    -0.02  0.04    0.03  0.08    0.41  0.13   
Post-Secondary 
Degree  0.89  0.05  ***   0.83  0.11 ***  0.38  0.18 **  0.19  0.07 ***  0.06  0.14     0.62  0.39    0.01  0.05    0.05  0.11    0.38  0.14   
Bad Health  -0.19  0.03  ***   -0.11  0.06 *   -0.09  0.07    -0.13  0.04 ***  -0.09  0.07     -0.33  0.11 ***  -0.11  0.03 ***  -0.15  0.07 **  0.06 0.07  *** 
Number of ADL  -0.02  0.01     -0.08  0.03 ***  -0.03  0.05    0.00 0.02    -0.02  0.04     -0.18  0.13    -0.05  0.01 ***  -0.02  0.03    -0.07  0.04  *** 
Recall Score  0.07  0.01 ***   0.06  0.02 ***   0.04  0.02 **    -0.01  0.01     -0.02  0.02     -0.04  0.03     0.03  0.01 ***   0.02  0.02     0.03  0.02 *** 
2nd Income 
Quartile 
0.20  0.04  ***   0.26 0.07 ***  -0.03  0.11    -0.34  0.05 ***  -0.35  0.09  ***  -0.13  0.15     0.08 0.04 **  0.12 0.07 *   0.00 0.10  ** 
3d Income 
Quartile  0.30  0.04 ***   0.40  0.08 ***   0.04  0.10     -0.50  0.05 ***   -0.54  0.10 ***   -0.40  0.15 ***   0.15  0.04 ***   0.14  0.09     -0.03  0.09 *** 
4th Income 
Quartile  0.40  0.05 ***   0.39  0.10 ***   0.19  0.10 *    -0.55  0.06 ***   -0.58  0.11 ***   -0.25  0.14 *    0.39  0.06 ***   0.41  0.12 ***   0.16  0.10 *** 
2nd Wealth 
Quartile 
0.54  0.04 ***   0.61  0.08 ***   0.62  0.14 ***   0.40  0.07 ***   0.55  0.13 ***   -0.08  0.19     -0.52  0.04 ***   -0.44  0.08 ***   -0.26  0.10 *** 
3d Wealth 
Quartile  1.09  0.04 ***   1.20  0.08 ***   0.84  0.13 ***   0.66  0.07 ***   0.76  0.13 ***   0.26  0.18     -0.21  0.04 ***   0.02  0.09     -0.05  0.09 *** 
4th Wealth 
Quartile  1.52  0.05  ***   1.46  0.09 ***  1.23  0.13 ***  0.93  0.07 ***  1.01  0.13  ***  0.70  0.18 ***  0.05  0.05    0.33  0.10 ***  0.26  0.10   
Working  0.11  0.06  *    -0.08  0.12    0.26  0.17    -..-  -..-   -..-  -..-   -..-  -..-   -0.07  0.06    0.02  0.12    -0.10  0.15   
Retired  0.15  0.05  ***    -0.01  0.11    0.23  0.19    -..-  -..-   -..-  -..-   -..-  -..-   -0.04  0.05    -0.01  0.10    -0.26  0.15   
Probability to 
leave a bequest 
0.58  0.06  ***   0.58  0.13 ***  0.44  0.15 ***  0.63  0.12 ***  0.54  0.22  **  0.22  0.22    1.20  0.04 ***  1.14  0.10 ***  1.60  0.13  *** 
Provides help to 
others 




0.09  0.03  ***   0.12 0.06 **  -0.03  0.07    0.04 0.04    0.09 0.07     -0.14  0.10     0.07 0.03 **  0.01 0.07    0.18 0.07  ** 
Constant  -3.74  0.49  ***   -3.53  0.97 ***  -0.73  1.61    -0.86  0.63    -1.74  1.15     -3.81  2.66    -5.30  0.50 ***  -4.57  1.07 ***  -8.36  1.54  *** 
                                                       
Log Likelihood  -6,136.1    -1,577.2   -949.2    -3,384.1   -1,076.7   -403.6    -5,365.4   -1,200.2   -1,091.6 
                                                                                                    
 
Notes: Standard errors are robust. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.   49
Table A.2  Asset amounts quantile regressions for the US as whole, US Midwest and Germany 
 
STOCKS   OWN  BUSINESS    HOME 
United States    US Midwest  Germany  United States  US Midwest    Germany  United States  US Midwest  Germany  Variable 
Coeff. Std. 
Error     Coeff.  Std. 
Error   Coeff. Std. 
Error   Coeff. Std. 
Error   Coeff. Std. 
Error     Coeff. Std. 
Error   Coeff. Std. 
Error   Coeff. Std. 
Error   Coeff.  Std. 
Error 
                                                              
Age   -0.05 0.03 *    -0.04 0.06      0.13 0.16     0.06 0.07     0.14 0.09      0.42  0.97    -0.01 0.01     -0.01 0.01     0.04 0.04   
Age squared  0.00  0.00 **    0.00  0.00     0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00     0.00 0.01     0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00    0.00  0.00   
Couple  0.13  0.10    0.02  0.21     0.73  0.48    0.49  0.25 *    0.44  0.33     1.37 1.50     -0.01  0.03    0.11  0.05 **    0.15  0.14   
Widow  0.14  0.11    0.16  0.22     0.45  0.60    0.19  0.29    0.06  0.35     -0.67  2.17     0.01  0.04    0.14  0.05 ***   0.00  0.16   
Never Married  0.21  0.16    0.02  0.32     0.55  0.60    0.33  0.43    0.65  0.53     -0.35  1.67     -0.12  0.06 **    -0.06  0.08    -0.15  0.20   
Household Size  -0.10  0.03 ***   -0.16  0.07 **    0.11  0.15     0.03  0.08     0.01  0.12     0.09  0.41     0.07  0.01 ***   0.05  0.02 ***   0.08  0.04 * 
High School 
Graduate  0.41  0.12 ***   0.35  0.25     1.22  0.63 *   -0.13  0.28    0.01  0.35     -0.63  1.69    0.17  0.03 ***  0.02  0.05    0.14  0.14   
Post-Secondary 
Degree 
1.21  0.13 ***   1.13  0.27  ***  1.76  0.64 ***  -0.24  0.30    0.19  0.38     -0.86  1.70    0.43  0.04 ***  0.24  0.06 ***  0.24  0.15   
Bad Health  -0.21 0.06 ***    -0.35 0.13  ***   0.00 0.21     -0.03 0.16     0.06 0.19      -0.39  0.75    -0.10 0.02 ***   -0.11 0.03 ***   -0.09 0.06   
Number of ADL  -0.06 0.03 *    -0.05 0.07      0.16 0.17     -0.01 0.08     0.05 0.10      -0.69  0.92    -0.03 0.01 ***   -0.01 0.01     -0.02 0.04   
Recall Score  0.06  0.02 ***   0.04  0.04     0.03  0.06    0.02  0.05    0.03  0.06     -0.06  0.16    0.05  0.01 ***  0.04  0.01 ***  0.01  0.02   
2nd Income 
Quartile  0.10  0.09    0.21  0.17     0.14  0.36    -0.12  0.20    0.03  0.22     0.07 0.97     0.10  0.03 ***   0.05  0.04    -0.10  0.09   
3d Income 
Quartile  0.10 0.09    0.31 0.18  *   -0.37  0.31    -0.32  0.20    -0.44  0.22  **  0.46  0.93     0.15 0.03 ***  0.09 0.04 **  -0.09  0.09   
4th Income 
Quartile 
0.28  0.10 ***   0.42  0.20 **    0.21  0.29     -0.03  0.20     -0.11  0.24     0.08  0.78     0.43  0.04 ***   0.20  0.05 ***   -0.10  0.08  
2nd Wealth 
Quartile  0.57  0.13 ***   0.92  0.23 ***   -0.11  0.50     0.23  0.32     0.25  0.34     0.91  1.43     0.18  0.03 ***   0.16  0.04 ***   0.09  0.10  
3d Wealth 
Quartile  1.18  0.12 ***   1.60  0.23 ***   -0.01  0.51     0.62  0.31 **    0.74  0.33 **    0.13  1.36     0.42  0.03 ***   0.36  0.04 ***   0.12  0.09  
4th Wealth 
Quartile 
2.21  0.12 ***   2.78  0.23  ***  0.88  0.51 *   1.42  0.31 ***  1.37  0.33  ***   0.05  1.24    0.75  0.03 ***  0.63  0.04 ***  0.32  0.09  *** 
Retired  0.17  0.12    0.43  0.25  *    0.38  0.62    -..-  -..-   -..-  -..-   -..-  -..-   -0.04  0.04    0.03  0.06    -0.06  0.14   
Working  -0.30  0.13 **    -0.12  0.26     0.37  0.62    -..-  -..-   -..-  -..-   -..-  -..-   -0.06  0.04    0.00  0.06    0.03  0.14   
Probability to 
leave a bequest  0.59  0.21 ***   0.11  0.44     1.05  0.62 *   1.33  0.64 **  -0.41  0.64     0.23  1.70    0.40  0.05 ***  0.33  0.07 ***  0.25  0.17   
Provides help to 




0.04  0.06    0.02  0.11     -0.09  0.21    0.12  0.14    0.09  0.16     0.08 0.67     -0.03  0.02    0.02  0.03    0.06  0.06   
Constant  8.94  1.06 ***   9.04  2.16 ***   0.68  5.27     6.40  2.48 ***   5.50  2.96 *    -3.99  ###      10.71 0.37 ***   10.87 0.50 ***   9.74  1.39 *** 
                                                                                                    
 
Notes: Standard errors have been computed using 100 bootstrap replications. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  50












nt Effect   







                              
Oaxaca Standard  1.1155  0.4607  0.6549  0.2662  0.0126  0.2536 
US – 
Sweden  Neuman-Oaxaca with 
Selectivity  1.1155 0.4774  0.6382 
1.47*** 0.39 
0.2662 0.0099  0.2563 
-0.708*** 1.01 
                              
Oaxaca Standard  1.562  0.2866  1.2754  -0.1023  -0.0373  -0.065 
US - 
Denmark  Neuman-Oaxaca with 
Selectivity  1.562 0.2891 1.2729 
1.47*** -1.14 
-0.1023 -0.04  -0.0623 
-0.708*** -1.80** 
                            
Oaxaca Standard  0.9547  0.057  0.8977  -0.5545  -0.0734  -0.4811 
US - 
Germany  Neuman-Oaxaca with 
Selectivity  0.9547 0.0721  0.8827 
1.47*** -1.48 
-0.5545 -0.0782  -0.4764 
-0.708*** -1.04 
                          
Oaxaca Standard  0.4561  0.0928  0.3633  -0.8195  -0.0517  -0.7678 
US - 
Netherlands  Neuman-Oaxaca with 
Selectivity  0.4561 0.1171  0.3391 
1.47*** -10.07 
-0.8195 -0.0585  -0.761 
-0.708*** 0.52* 
                              
Oaxaca Standard  0.396  0.1843  0.2118  -0.388  0.1085  -0.4965 
US – 
Belgium  Neuman-Oaxaca with 
Selectivity  0.396 0.2064 0.1896 
1.47*** 2.63* 
-0.388 0.1029  -0.4909 
-0.708*** 0.50 
                            
Oaxaca Standard  1.0993  0.4522  0.6471  -0.5396  0.1541  -0.6938 
US – France 
Neuman-Oaxaca with 
Selectivity  1.0993 0.4497  0.6496 
1.47*** 1.23 
-0.5396 0.1498  -0.6894 
-0.708*** -1.11** 
                            
Oaxaca Standard  0.1473  0.3039  -0.1566  -1.131  0.0198  -1.1508 
US - 
Switzerland  Neuman-Oaxaca with 
Selectivity  0.1473 0.33 -0.1827 
1.47*** 3.34 
-1.131 0.0139  -1.1449 
-0.708*** 0.88 
                            
Oaxaca Standard  1.2012  -0.2853  1.4866  -0.3873  0.0548  -0.442 
US – 
Austria  Neuman-Oaxaca with 
Selectivity  1.2012 -0.2548  1.456 
1.47*** 6.88 
-0.3873 0.0497  -0.437 
-0.708*** 0.92 
                              
Oaxaca Standard  0.8993  0.2126  0.6867  -0.3862  0.2585  -0.6447 
US – Italy 
Neuman-Oaxaca with 
Selectivity  0.8993 0.2511  0.6482 
1.47*** -15.17 
-0.3862 0.2535  -0.6398 
-0.708*** 0.97 
                        
Oaxaca Standard  1.1773  0.4475  0.7298  -0.3019  0.3662  -0.668 
US – Spain 
Neuman-Oaxaca with 
Selectivity  1.1773 0.4824  0.6949 
1.47*** -5.12 
-0.3019 0.3532  -0.6551 
-0.708*** -0.90 
                              
Oaxaca Standard  1.8602  0.2217  1.6386  0.2054  0.2075  -0.0021 
US – Greece 
Neuman-Oaxaca with 
Selectivity  1.8602 0.2363  1.6239 
1.47*** -0.96 
0.2054 0.202  0.0033 
-0.708*** 0.33 
                          
Oaxaca Standard  0.9761  0.2101  0.766  -0.7206  0.0684  -0.789 
US - 
England  Neuman-Oaxaca with 
Selectivity  0.9761 0.2406  0.7354 
1.47*** 1.29 
-0.7206 0.0637  -0.7843 
-0.708*** -0.03 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Studying portfolio structure has recently become both more informative and more interesting in its own right. Theory and 
country-level data on the structure of household portfolios are presented in the contributions contained in Guiso, Haliassos, 
and Jappelli (2001); and in the review paper of Haliassos (2006). Retirement accounts were a major factor promoting 
stockholding participation in the US. Limited stockholding participation in the early to mid 1980s was documented in US 
data by King and Leape (1984), Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), and Haliassos and Bertaut (1995). A number of authors have 
recently explored determinants of participation in stockholding. See, for example, Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Cocco et al. 
(2005), Heaton and Lucas (2000), Gollier (2001), Campbell and Viceira (2002), Haliassos and Michaelides (2003), and 
Gomes and Michaelides (2005). Bilias et al. (2006 a, b) explore effects of increased participation on the distribution of 
wealth and stock trading patterns, respectively. Campbell (2006) discusses stockholding participation, as well as under-
diversification, and mortgage behavior of households, while reviewing the relevant literature. Campbell and Cocco (2003) 
study optimal mortgage choice, while Cocco (2005) studies effects of housing on the composition of the financial portfolio. 
2 The demographic transition and the resulting inability of social security systems to provide customary benefit levels are 
forcing households in major European countries and the US to accumulate for retirement on their own, and governments to 
provide tax and other incentives for doing so. The process neither started simultaneously nor is it progressing at an even 
pace across countries, thus intensifying cross-country variation in mature portfolios. 
3 Indirect stockholding in the form of stocks in defined-contribution occupational pension plans is not available in the data 
and is therefore not included in our analysis. 
4 For recent examples, see Albrecht et al. (2003), Mata and Machado (2005). 
5 There is a vast literature on import controls and other trade restrictions, but we can point here to studies that find a home 
bias in trade, namely a tendency for trade to occur within national borders than across them with neighboring countries, 
even after controlling for tariffs (McCallum, 1995; Helliwell, 1998). 
6 The reference here is to the literature on foreign portfolio investment. Perhaps the most telling subset focuses on the 
observed tendency of households to under-invest in foreign stocks, the well-known ‘home equity bias’ (French and Poterba, 
1991; Tesar and Werner, 1995; Kang and Stulz, 1997; Pastor, 2000, Christelis and Georgarakos, 2008). 
7 Foreign direct investment is a prime example of acquisition of a foreign real asset extensively studied in the literature. In 
their seminal paper, Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found that domestic saving rates explain over 90% of the variation in 
investment rates in a sample ending in 1974. Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) report similar findings for the more recent period 
1990-1997. 
8 For surveys of the vast literature on the law of one price and the purchasing power parity hypothesis, see for example 
Rogoff (1996) and Taylor and Taylor (2004). 
9 While the international version of the capital asset pricing model, ICAPM, is not rejected for developed countries (with the 
exception of Japan), it performs much more poorly for emerging markets that are more likely segmented (see Harvey, 1991; 
Bekaert and Harvey, 1995 and 2000). 
10 All forms of direct and indirect stockholding are included, except for occupational defined-contribution pension plans, for 
which data are not collected in our sources. 
11 Except Switzerland. 
12 The US and Switzerland exhibit the largest stock holdings at the median and at the bottom quartile; Belgium is added for 
the top quartile of holdings. Denmark, Netherlands and Belgium top the list for median values of private businesses. 
Germany and the Netherlands clearly dominate the top of the distribution. Switzerland, England and the Netherlands 
dominate in terms of real values of primary residence, across all quartiles. 
13 Work status is not included in regressions pertaining to private business ownership, in order to avoid potential 
endogeneity problems arising from the fact that owning a private business typically implies work status. 
14  Survey participants are read 10 words and are then asked to repeat them, with the score in the recall test being equal to 
the number of correctly remembered words. For the effect of cognitive abilities (including recall) on stockholding see 
Christelis et al. (2006). 
15 We are grateful to Julia LeBlanc for providing us with comparative information on pension systems from her own 
dissertation work on individual retirement accounts in the SHARE countries. 
16 In Sweden, 2.5 percentage units of the 18.5 percentage units of lifetime income that are required as contribution to the 
public retirement scheme are saved and earn interest in a premium reserve account. The person insured can choose an 
investment manager for his or her premium reserve account, with the option to invest in stocks. In Denmark, The Special 
Pension (SP) is a mandatory individual retirement program (second pillar) with an annual contribution rate of 1% which 
was introduced in 1999. 
17 Spain and England are missing from this list picked up by our estimates. 
18 Exceptions are Italy, Spain, Greece and England.   52
                                                                                                                                                                        
19 Market conditions in the S are estimated to be substantially less favorable to stockholding than in the MW; and similarly 
for the NE for home- and business ownership. 
20 Our estimates imply that the characteristics of Spanish and English populations are somewhat less conducive to business 
ownership. 
21 See also Albrecht et al. (2003). 
22 The thresholds for income and wealth quartiles are defined for the base country or region over all households in the 
sample. Households in the country or region under comparison to the base are then placed in quartiles according to those 
thresholds.   
23 They are reversed among small Swedish business owners and large Austrian owners. 
24 Sweden and Denmark are exceptions. In Greece, differences are relatively small and get reversed in the top 15% of the 
distribution. 
25 The largest covariate effects are observed vis-à-vis the southern countries (Italy, Spain, Greece) and England. 
26  We chose as our baseline specification the one with income and wealth quartiles because it is less subject to 
measurement error and is found preferable according to both the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria. 
27 Given the computational intensity of this decomposition we estimate 19 quantile regressions (at every 5
th percentile). 
28 We estimate a standard Heckman model with selection using the same set of explanatory variables we employ in our 
baseline specifications (presented in Sections 3.1 and 4.1) in both the first and the second stage.  Thus, identification is 
obtained through the nonlinearity of the Mills ratio. 